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Abstract
Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic is a dynamic modal logic that uses
an arbitrary arrow update modality to quantify over all arrow updates.
Some properties of this logic have already been established, but until now
it remained an open question whether the logic’s satisfiability problem
is decidable. Here, we show that the satisfiability problem of Arbitrary
Arrow Update Logic is co-RE hard, and therefore undecidable, by a re-
duction of the tiling problem.
1 Introduction
In the ﬁeld of Dynamic Epistemic Logic, various kinds of updates are used to
model events that change the information state of agents. These kinds of up-
dates include public announcements [11, 4], action models [4] and arrow updates
[10], among others. Somewhat recently, there has been a trend to enrich logics
with “arbitrary” versions of such updates. See for example Arbitrary Public
Announcement Logic (APAL) [3], Group Announcement Logic (GAL) [1], Ar-
bitrary Action Model Logic (AAML) [9], and Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic
(AAUL) [6, 7]. The intuition behind these “arbitrary” operators is that they
represent universal quantiﬁcation over their non-arbitrary counterpart; for ex-
ample, ϕ is true after an arbitrary public announcement if ϕ is true after every
public announcement.
For some of these logics, namely APAL and GAL, the satisﬁability problem
is undecidable [8, 2]. The satisﬁability problem of AAML, on the other hand,
is decidable [9]. For AAUL, it remained unknown whether the satisﬁability
problem is decidable. Here, we show that AAUL’s satisﬁability problem can
encode the tiling problem [13]. Because the tiling problem is known to be co-
RE complete [5], this shows that the satisﬁability problem of AAUL is co-RE
hard.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2 we introduce
the syntax and semantics of AAUL. Then, in Section 3 we provide a brief deﬁ-
nition of the tiling problem and show that it can be encoded in the satisﬁability
problem of AAUL.
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2 AAUL Syntax and Semantics
Let P be a countable set of propositional variables and A a ﬁnite set of agents.
We assume that |A| ≥ 6.
Definition 1. The language LAAUL of AAUL is given by the following normal
forms:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | aϕ | [U ]ϕ | [l]ϕ
U ::= (ϕ, a, ϕ) | U, (ϕ, a, ϕ)
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. The language LAUL is the fragment of LAAUL that
does not contain [l].
We use ∨,→,↔,♦, 〈U〉, 〈l〉,
∨
and
∧
in the usual way as abbreviations. Fur-
thermore, we slightly abuse notation by identifying the list U = (ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · ,
(ϕk, ak, ψk) with the set U = {(ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · , (ϕk, ak, ψk)}.
AAUL is evaluated on standard multi-agent Kripke models.
Definition 2. A modelM is a tripleM = (W,R, V ) whereW is a set of states,
R : A → 2W×W assigns to each agent an accessibility relation and V : P → 2W
is a valuation.
Note that we are using the class of all Kripke models. This is unlike APAL
and GAL, which are typically considered on the class of S5 models.
Now, let us consider the semantics of AAUL. We start by giving the formal
deﬁnition, after the deﬁnition we brieﬂy discuss the intuition behind some of
the operators.
Definition 3. Let M = (W,R, V ) be a model and let w ∈W . The satisfaction
relation |= is given by
M, w |= p iﬀ w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M, w 6|= ϕ
M, w |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iﬀ M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= aϕ iﬀ M, v |= ϕ for each v such that (w, v) ∈ R(a)
M, w |= [U ]ϕ iﬀ (M∗ U), w |= ϕ
M, w |= [l]ϕ iﬀ M, w |= [U ]ϕ for each U ∈ LAUL
where (M∗ U) is given by:
M∗ U = (W,RU , V )
RU (a) = {(v, v′) ∈ R(a) | ∃(ϕ, a, ϕ′) ∈ U :
(M, v |= ϕ and M, v′ |= ϕ′)}
A full discussion of the applications of AAUL and of the intuitions behind
the semantics of arrow updates and arbitrary arrow updates is outside the scope
of this paper. For such a discussion, see [10] and [7]. However, in order to
understand the undecidability proof it is important to understand the semantics
2
of AAUL. We therefore do provide a very brief explanation of the intuition
behind and the semantics of AAUL.
Although our goal is to understand AAUL, is is useful to start by consider-
ing public announcements. We assume that the reader is familiar with public
announcement logic, if not see for example [4]. A public announcement [ψ] in-
forms all agents that ψ is true. As a result, every possible world that the agents
previously considered possible that does not satisfy ψ is rejected after the an-
nouncement, since it is incompatible with the new information. Semantically,
this corresponds to a model M being transformed into a model M ∗ ψ where
all ¬ψ states of M have been removed.
Like public announcements, arrow updates provide agents with new informa-
tion. Unlike with public announcements, however, the new information provided
by an arrow update can (i) diﬀer per agent and (ii) depend on the current state.
A typical example is a card game, where cards have been dealt face down. Now,
agent a picks up her hand of cards and looks at it. Obviously, the information
that a gains from this action is diﬀerent than the information the other agents
gain: a learns what her cards are whereas the other agents only learn that a now
knows what her cards are. It is perhaps less obvious that the information that
a gains also diﬀers per state. Suppose that a has been dealt the 7 of Hearts.
Then by looking at her cards a learns that she has the 7 of Hearts. If, on the
other hand, a has been dealt the 8 of Clubs, then she learns that she has the 8
of Clubs. Learning that you have the 7 of Hearts is diﬀerent from learning that
you have the 8 of Clubs, so the information given to a depends on the state of
the world.
With arrow updates we formalize the information that the agents gain in
such a situation. In principle, we could do this in two ways: we could specify
the things that are incompatible with the new information, or the things that
are compatible. We choose to follow public announcements in this aspect, so
just like [ψ] says that the new information is compatible with ψ, we use an
arrow update U to specify the information that is compatible with U . Since
the information gained in an arrow update can depend on the agent and on the
current state, we need triple (ϕ, a, ψ). We call such triple clauses ; they can be
read as “if the current state satisﬁes ϕ, then the information provided to agent
a is compatible with ψ.”
An arrow update U is a ﬁnite set clauses, U = {(ϕ1, a1, ψ1), · · · , (ϕk, ak, ψk)}
(where it is possible that ϕi = ϕj , ai = aj or ψi = ψj for i 6= j). This still
leaves the decision of what to do if a state matches multiple clauses. Suppose,
for example, that (ϕ1, a, ψ1), (ϕ2, a, ψ2) ∈ U and that a state satisﬁes both ϕ1
and ϕ2. There are several options for how to interpret this situation, we choose
to interpret it disjunctively: if a state satisﬁes ϕ1 and ϕ2, then any state that
satisﬁes ψ1 or ψ2 is consistent with the new information.
On the semantical level, this means that M ∗ U should contain exactly
those arrows of M that match at least one clause of U , where we say that
(w1, w2) ∈ R(a) matches (ϕ1, a1, ψ1) if and only if M, w1 |= ϕ1, a = a1 and
M, w2 |= ψ1.
Arbitrary arrow updates then quantify over such arrow updates. However, in
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order to avoid circularity we restrict this quantiﬁcation to those arrow updates
that do not themselves contain an arbitrary arrow update [l]. So M, w |= [l]ϕ
if and only if M, w |= [U ]ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LAUL.
3 Reducing the Tiling Problem
3.1 The Tiling Problem
We will prove the undecidability of AAUL by a reduction of the tiling problem.
The tiling problem was introduced in [13] and can be deﬁned as follows.
Definition 4. Let C be a ﬁnite set of colors. A tile type is a function i :
{north, south, east ,west} → C.
An instance of the tiling problem is a ﬁnite set types of tile types. A solution
to an instance of the tiling problem is a function tiling : Z × Z → types such
that, for every (z1, z2) ∈ Z× Z,
tiling(z1, z2)(north) = tiling(z1, z2 + 1)(south)
tiling(z1, z2)(east) = tiling(z1 + 1, z2)(west).
The tiling problem was shown to be undecidable in [5]. In fact, the tiling
problem is co-RE complete. Therefore, by reducing the tiling problem to the
satisﬁability problem of AAUL, we show that the latter problem is co-RE hard.
Whether AAUL’s satisﬁability problem is co-RE is not currently known.
3.2 Encoding the Tiling Problem in AAUL
We want to encode the tiling problem in AAUL. So for every instance types of
the tiling problem we deﬁne a formula ψtypes of AAUL that is satisﬁable if and
only if types can tile the plane. The strategy for doing this is as follows.
We represent each point of Z×Z by a state. For every i ∈ types we then use a
propositional variable pi to represent “the current state contains a tile of type i.”
For every c ∈ C we use propositional variables northc (resp. southc, eastc,westc)
to represent the northern (resp. southern, eastern, western) edge of the current
tile having color c. Finally, we use relations up, down , left and right to represent
one tile being above, below, to the left and to the right, respectively, of the
current tile.
In addition to the states (n,m) that correspond to points in Z× Z, we also
use an auxiliary state s0. This state s0 is not part of the grid, and does not
contain any tile. Instead, it is the state where ψtypes will be evaluated. We
therefore also refer to s0 as the origin state. In order to distinguish s0 from the
states that are part of the grid we use the propositional variable p, which holds
on s0 but not on any (n,m).
Now, given any state (n,m), it is relatively easy to check whether the con-
straints of a tiling are satisﬁed locally. For example,
∨
i∈types pi∧
∧
i6=j∈types ¬(pi∧
pj) holds if and only if the current state has exactly one type of tile, and
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∧
c∈C(northc → upsouthc) holds if and only if the northern color of the current
tile matches the southern color of the tile above.
Making sure that the global constraints of a tiling are satisﬁed is harder,
though. We do this in the following way. Firstly, we take a relation b, and force
it to act as a kind of transitive closure1 over up, down , left and right . So while∨
i∈types pi ∧
∧
i6=j∈types ¬(pi ∧ pj) says that the current state has exactly one
tile type, the formula b
∨
i∈types pi ∧
∧
i6=j∈types ¬(pi ∧ pj) says that all states
(except the current one2) have exactly one tile type. Secondly, we enforce a
grid-like structure onto the domain.
With the above in mind, let us deﬁne the formula ψtypes .
Definition 5. Let types be an instance of the tiling problem. The formula
ψtypes is given by
ψtypes := ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧
∧
x∈D
(ψ3,x ∧ ψ4,x ∧ propdx ∧ returnx)
∧ inverse ∧ commute
∧ one tile ∧ one color ∧ tile colors ∧ tile match
where
D := {up, down , left , right}
ψ1 := ref a ∧ p ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧b¬p
ψ2 := b(ref a ∧ ♦bp) ∧ [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤)
ψ3,x := b(♦x(¬p ∧ ref a ∧ ♦bp) ∧ [l](♦x♦a⊤ → x♦a⊤))
ψ4,x := [l](♦a⊤ → bxb♦a⊤)
ref a := ♦a♦a⊤ ∧ [l]¬♦aa⊥
propdx := b[l]((a⊥ ∧ ♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥))→ [Ux ]〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥))
Ux := (p ∨a⊥, b,⊤), (⊤, a,⊤), (a⊥, x,⊤)
returnx := b〈l〉(a⊥ ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ (♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤)))
inverse := b[l](a⊥ → (updowna⊥ ∧downupa⊥
∧leftrighta⊥ ∧rightlefta⊥))
commute := b[l]
∧
(x,y)∈E
(♦x♦ya⊥ → yxa⊥)
E := {(up, left), (up, right), (down , left), (down , right),
(left , up), (left , down), (right , up), (right , down)}
1The precise properties of b are more complicated than this, but for the purpose of this
informal introduction to the proof it suffices to think of it as a transitive closure.
2Recall that ψtypes will be evaluated in s0, so the “current state” in question is s0, which
does not have a tile type.
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one tile := b(
∨
i∈tiles
pi ∧
∧
i6=j∈tiles
¬(pi ∧ pj))
one color := b
∧
c∈C
(northc →
∧
d∈C\{c}
¬northd)∧
b
∧
c∈C
(southc →
∧
d∈C\{c}
¬southd)∧
b
∧
c∈C
(eastc →
∧
d∈C\{c}
¬eastd)∧
b
∧
c∈C
(westc →
∧
d∈C\{c}
¬westd)
tile colors := b
∧
i∈tiles
(pi → (northi(north)
∧ southi(south) ∧ east i(east) ∧ west i(west)))
tile match := b
∧
c∈C
((northc → upsouthc) ∧ (west c → lefteastc))
The ﬁrst line of ψtypes guarantees that each state other than the origin
has exactly one successor for each direction x ∈ D, and that b is transitive
over all x ∈ D (by which we mean: if (s0, s1) ∈ R(b) and (s1, s2) ∈ R(x),
then (s0, s2) ∈ R(b)). The second line of ψtypes then guarantees that the four
directions form a grid. Finally, the third line of ψtypes guarantees that the grid
is tiled in an appropriate way.
We need to show that ψtypes is satisﬁable if and only if types can tile Z×Z.
We start by showing that if such a tiling exists, then ψtypes is satisﬁable.
Lemma 1. Suppose types can tile Z× Z. Then ψtypes is satisfiable.
Proof. Let tiling be the tiling, let pn,m ∈ P for every n,m ∈ Z and let M =
(S,R, V ) be the following, quite straightforward, encoding of tiling :
• S = (Z× Z) ∪ s0
• R(a) = {(s, s) | s ∈ S}
• R(b) = {(s0, (n,m)) | n,m ∈ Z} ∪ {((n,m), s0) | n,m ∈ Z}
• R(up) = {((n,m), (n,m+ 1)) | n,m ∈ Z}
• R(down) = {((n,m), (n,m− 1)) | n,m ∈ Z}
• R(left) = {((n,m), (n− 1,m)) | n,m ∈ Z}
• R(right) = {((n,m), (n+ 1,m)) | n,m ∈ Z}
• V (p) = {s0}
• V (pi) = {(n,m) | tiling(n,m) = i} for i ∈ tiles
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• V (northc) = {(n,m) | ((tiling)(n,m))(north) = c} for c ∈ C
• V (southc) = {(n,m) | ((tiling)(n,m))(south) = c} for c ∈ C
• V (eastc) = {(n,m) | ((tiling)(n,m))(east) = c} for c ∈ C
• V (westc) = {(n,m) | ((tiling)(n,m))(west) = c} for c ∈ C
• V (pn,m) = {(n,m)}
As mentioned above, the state s0 is special: it is the origin state, and the only
state that does not have a tile type associated with it. The propositional variable
p is used to identify this special state. We will show that M, s0 |= ψtypes .
Note that R(a) is the identity relation. As a result, there can be no arrow
update that retains the a-arrow from s to some state s′ but removes the a-arrow
from s′. So M |= ♦a♦a⊤∧ [l]¬♦aa⊥ and therefore, by deﬁnition, M |= ref a.
Now, consider the pointed model M, s0. It is straightforward to verify that
M, s0 |= p ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ b¬p. Because we already determined that M, s0 |= ref a,
this suﬃces to show that M, s0 |= ψ1.
Additionally, M |= ref a together with the fact that there are b-arrows from
s0 to every (n,m) and from every (n,m) to s0, which satisﬁes p, implies that
M, s0 |= b(ref a∧♦bp). Furthermore, every state (n,m) has only one outgoing
b-arrow, namely the one to s0. So for any arrow update U , if U retains the
a-arrow on s0 then it must also retain the a-arrow on any state that is b-
reachable from a state (n,m), since it is the same a-arrow. So M, s0 |= [l
](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤). We have shown that M, s0 satisﬁes both conjuncts of ψ2,
so M, s0 |= ψ2.
Now, let us look at ψ3,x. For every direction x and every (n,m), there
is an x-arrow from (n,m) to some (n′,m′). Like (n,m), this (n′,m′) satisﬁes
¬p∧ref a∧♦bp, so we haveM, (n,m) |= ♦x(¬p∧ref a∧♦bp). For every direction
there is only one such successor (n′,m′). This implies that every arrow update
either removes the a-arrow from all x-successors of (n,m), or it retains the
a-arrow of all such successors. This implies that M, (n,m) |= [l](♦x♦a⊤ →
x♦a⊤). This is true for any (n,m), so we haveM, s0 |= ψ3,x for every direction
x ∈ D.
All states (n,m) have a b-arrow to the same state s0. Once again we use the
fact that every arrow update either eliminates or retains the a-arrow on this sin-
gle world, it cannot do both. It follows that M, s0 |= [l](♦a⊤ → bxb♦a⊤),
so, by deﬁnition, M, s0 |= ψ4,x.
Now we get to the more diﬃcult part, where we need to show that s0 sat-
isﬁes the rather complicated formula propdx, for every direction x. For ease of
notation, we will show that propd right holds, the proof for the other directions
is similar. Fix any (n,m), and let U be any update such that the antecedent of
the implication in propd right holds after U , i.e.
M∗ U, (n,m) |= a⊥ ∧ ♦right♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
〈l〉(♦right♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥)
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The assumption that this antecedent holds places some restrictions on U . The
ﬁrst conjunct says that the a-arrow on (n,m) is removed. The second conjunct
says that the right -arrow from (n,m) to (n + 1,m) is retained, and so is the
a-arrow on (n + 1,m). The third conjunct says that the b-arrow from (n,m)
to s0 is retained, that at least one b-arrow from s0 to some (n
′,m′) is retained
and that every (u, v) that is b-accessible from s0 still has its a-arrow. The ﬁnal
conjunct then says that there is some arrow update, call it U ′, that
• retains the right -arrow from (n,m) to (n+1,m) and the a-arrow on (n+
1,m),
• retains the b-arrow from (n,m) to s0 and the b-arrow from s0 to some
state (u, v) and
• removes the a-arrow on (u, v).
In particular, the fact that the a-arrow on (u, v) is removed while that on (n+
1,m) is retained shows that, (u, v) 6= (n+ 1,m).
For any such U , we need to show that the consequent is true in (n,m), i.e.
that
M∗ U, (n,m) |= [Uright ]〈l〉(♦right♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥).
Recall that Uright = (p∨a⊥, b,⊤), (⊤, a,⊤), (a⊥, right ,⊤). So Uright retains
all b-arrows from s0 (sinceM∗U, s0 |= p), the b-arrow from (n,m) to s0 and the
right -arrow from (n,m) to (n + 1,m) (since M∗ U, (n,m) |= a⊥) and every
a-arrow—and therefore in particular the a-arrows on (n,m) and (u, v). Because
(u, v) 6= (n+1,m), the atom p(n+1,m) holds in (n+1,m) but not in (u, v). The
update U ′′ := (⊤, right ,⊤), (⊤, b,⊤), (p(n+1,m), a,⊤) therefore retains all right
and b arrows as well as the a-arrow on (n + 1,m) while removing the a-arrow
on (u, v). Since M ∗ U , and therefore also (M ∗ U) ∗ U ′′, contains a b-arrow
from (n,m) to s0 and from s0 to (u, v) as well as a right -arrow from (n,m) to
(n+ 1,m) we have (M∗ U) ∗ Uright , (n,m) |= [U ′′](♦right♦a⊤∧ ♦b♦ba⊥) and
therefore M∗ U, (n,m) |= [Uright ]〈l〉(♦right♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥), which was to be
shown.
This completes the proof that M, s0 |= propd right . We continue by showing
that M, s0 |= returnx. Again, we show that M, s0 |= returnright , the other
directions can be proven similarly. The formula returnright holds in M, s0 if
M, (n,m) |= 〈l〉(a⊥ ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ ♦right 〈l〉(♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤)))
for every (n,m). Let U1 := (⊤, right ,⊤), (⊤, b, p∨pn+1,m), (p(n+1,m), a,⊤). The
only b-arrows that are retained by U1 are those that go to s0 or to (n + 1,m).
Because the only remaining b-arrow from s0 is to (n+1,m), every arrow update
that retains the a-arrow on (n+ 1,m) must do so in every b-successor of every
b-successor of (n + 1,m), since (n + 1,m) is the only such b-b-successor. So
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M ∗ U1, (n + 1,m) |= [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤). Furthermore, U1 retains the a-
arrow on (n+1,m) so, again using the fact that (n+1,m) is the only remaining
b-successor of s0, we also have M∗ U1, (n+ 1,m) |= ♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤).
Putting these conjuncts together, and using the fact that |= χ → 〈l〉χ for
every χ, we get
M∗ U1, (n+ 1,m) |= 〈l〉(♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤) ∧ [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤)).
The update U1 also eliminates the a-arrow on (n,m) while retaining the b-arrow
from (n,m) to s0 and the right -arrow from (n,m) to (n+ 1,m), so
M∗ U1, (n,m) |= a⊥ ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ ♦right 〈l〉(♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤)).
We have U1 ∈ LAUL, so
M, (n,m) |= 〈l〉(a⊥ ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ ♦right 〈l〉(♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤))),
which was to be shown in order to prove that M, s0 |= returnright .
We continue with inverse. In M, the relations up and down are each
others inverses, as are left and right . Furthermore, all four direction rela-
tions are functions. It follows immediately that, for every (n,m), we have
M, (n,m) |= [l](a⊥ → rightlefta⊥), and similarly for the other combina-
tions of directions. So we have M, s0 |= inverse.
Similarly, in M we have R(right) ◦R(up) = R(up) ◦R(right), and the same
for the other directions. It follows that M, s0 |= b[l]
∧
(x,y)∈E(♦x♦ya⊥ →
yxa⊥).
The last four conjuncts of ψtypes simply encode the fact that tiling is a tiling
on Z× Z, so M, s0 satisﬁes those as well.
Left to show is that if ψtypes is satisﬁable, then types can tile the plane.
We do this by showing that any model where ψtypes is satisﬁed looks like the
model M that we constructed above. There are some diﬀerences, certainly.
For example, we cannot enforce that a state (n,m) has exactly one x-successor
for every direction x, only that it has at least one x-successor and that all
its x-successors are indistinguishable. Such diﬀerences are not relevant to the
existence of a tiling, however.
Lemma 2. If ψtypes is satisfiable, then there is a tiling on Z× Z for types.
Proof. Suppose ψtypes is satisﬁable. Then there is some pointed model M, s0
such that M, s0 |= ψtypes .
First, consider any state s such that M, s satisﬁes ref a. Then there is some
s′ that is a-accessible from s. Furthermore, by [l]¬♦aa⊥, there is no arrow
update that retains the a-arrow from s to s′ while removing any a-arrows from
s′. It follows that there is no modal formula ϕ that holds on s but not on s′,
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since otherwise (ϕ, a,⊤) would have been such an arrow update. So any state
s that satisﬁes ref a has an a-arrow to a state that is indistinguishable from s,
and it only has a-arrows to such indistinguishable states.
In order to make the proof easier to read, it is convenient to draw ﬁgures of
M as we use ψtypes to construct it. In these ﬁgures, we use the following rules
for simpliﬁcation:
1. We do not draw the entire model, but only those parts of it that are
of interest for the part of the proof illustrated by the ﬁgure. So unless
explicitly stated otherwise, the lack of a drawn arrow between two states
does not always indicate that there is no arrow between them.
2. When two states are modally indistinguishable, we draw them as if they
were one state. So, strictly speaking, when we draw a state s we mean an
equivalence class [s] of states.
3. Most states that we consider satisfy ref a. Together with the second rule
of simpliﬁcation, this means we could draw a reﬂexive a-arrow on those
worlds. For simplicity of presentation we do not draw these arrows.
Now, suppose M, s0 |= ψtypes . The ﬁrst conjunct of ψtypes states that M, s0 |=
ref a ∧ p∧♦b⊤∧b¬p. This means that, so far, our model looks something like
the following.
s0 : p
s1 : ¬p
b
Next, consider ψ2, the second conjunct of ψtypes , which states that M, s0 |=
b(ref a ∧ ♦bp) ∧ [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤). In particular, it implies that any state
s1 that is b-accessible from s0 satisﬁes ref a, and has a b-accessible p state.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there is any b-successor s′ of s1 that
is modally distinguishable from s0. Then there is some ϕ that holds on s0
but not on s′. Consider then the update U = (ϕ, a,⊤), (⊤, b,⊤). We have
M, s0 |= [U ](♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥), contradicting M, s0 |= [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤).
Our assumption that such distinguishable s′ exists was therefore false, so our
model looks like this:
s0 : p
s1 : ¬p
b
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Now, let us consider ψ3,x, which tells us that M, s0 |= b(♦x(¬p ∧ ref a ∧
♦bp)∧ [l](♦x♦a⊤ → x♦a⊤)) for every direction x ∈ D. Firstly, from M, s1 |=
♦x(¬p∧ref a∧♦bp) we learn that there is a state s2 that is accessible from s1, and
that this s2 satisﬁes ¬p, ref a and ♦bp. Furthermore, by M, s0 |= [l](♦x♦a⊤ →
x♦a⊤) we know that this s2 is unique (up to modal indistinguishability), since
otherwise there would be some arrow update that retains the a-arrow on s2 but
removes it from some other x-successor of s1.
Let us then look at the conjunct ψ4,x, which states thatM, s0 |= [l](♦a⊤ →
bxb♦a⊤). This tells us that every b-successor of s2 must be indistinguish-
able from s0, as otherwise there would be an arrow update removing the a-arrow
from such a successor while retaining the a-arrow on s0. Our drawing of the
model therefore becomes as follows.
s0 : p
s1 : ¬p s2 : ¬p
b
x
b
Now, we get to the hard part. The formula propdx, which is the ﬁfth conjunct
of ψtypes , tells us that
M, s0 |=b[l]((a⊥ ∧ ♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥))→ [Ux ]〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥))
where
Ux := (p ∨a⊥, b,⊤), (⊤, a,⊤), (a⊥, x,⊤).
The formula starts with b, which takes us to any b-successor of s0. Let us
assume without loss of generality that this is the s1 we drew earlier. In s1, it
must be the case that any update U1 that makes (a⊥ ∧ ♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧
b♦a⊤)∧ 〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤∧ ♦b♦ba⊥) true also makes [Ux ]〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤∧ ♦b♦ba⊥)
true. Let us look at what M ∗U1 would look like. Firstly, we haveM ∗U1, s1 |=
a⊥ ∧ ♦x♦a⊤. So the a-arrow on s1 is removed, while the x-arrow to s2 and
the a-arrow on s2 are retained.
Furthermore, M∗ U1, s1 |= ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤), so the b-arrow from s1 to s0
is retained, at least one b-arrow from s0 is retained and every b-arrow from s0
that still exists points to a ♦a state. So far, the situation in M ∗ U1 can be
drawn as in the following diagram, where s3 is some state b-accessible from s0.
s0
s1 : a⊥ s2 : ♦a⊤s3 : ♦a⊤
b
b
x
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Finally, M ∗ U1, s1 |= 〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥). So there is some arrow
update U2 that retains the a-arrow on s2 while removing the a-arrow on s3.
Such U2 exists if and only if s2 and s3 are modally distinguishable in M∗ U1.
The formula propdx states that for every such U1, we must have M∗ U1, s1 |=
[Ux ]〈l〉(♦x♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b♦ba⊥). The update Ux is designed in such a way that
it removes all arrows, other than the reﬂexive a-arrow, from s2 and s3 while
retaining the x arrow from s1 to s2 as well as the b-arrows from s1 to s0 and
from s0 to s3. So, using the simpliﬁcation rules, the drawing of (M∗ U1) ∗ Ux
is actually the same as the drawing of M∗ U1 given above.
However, there is a diﬀerence. In M∗U1, we did not draw any arrows from
s2 and s3 because there are not guaranteed to be such arrows. In (M∗U1) ∗Ux
we did not draw any such arrows because they are guaranteed not to exist.
We have (M∗U1) ∗Ux , s1 |= 〈l〉♦x♦a⊤∧♦b♦ba⊥, which is the case if and
only if s2 and s3 are distinguishable in (M∗ U1) ∗ Ux . Since, in (M ∗ U1) ∗ Ux ,
s2 and s3 have no outgoing arrows other than the a-arrow to a state that is
indistinguishable from them, it follows that s2 and s3 must be propositionally
distinguishable.
In summary, propdx states that, for any arrow update U1, ifM ∗U1 matches
the drawing shown above and s2 is distinguishable (in M ∗ U1) from some b-
successor (in M ∗ U1) s3 of s0, then it is propositionally distinguishable from
such a successor.
Furthermore, we can show that the states also have to be propositionally
distinguishable if they are distinguishable inM (as opposed toM∗U1). Suppose
that U1 is such that M∗U1 matches the drawing and that s2 is distinguishable
from s3 in M. Now, let χ be any modal formula that distinguishes between s2
and s3 and (by negating if necessary) assume that χ holds on s1. We distinguish
between three cases:
• Suppose U1 removes the b-arrows from both s2 and s3. Then let U ′1 :=
U1 ∪ {(χ ∧ ¬p, a,⊤)}.
• Suppose U1 removes the b-arrow from one of s2 and s3, while retaining
the other. Then let U ′1 := U1.
• Suppose U1 retains the b-arrows on both s2 and s3. Then let U ′1 be the
update obtained by replacing every clause (ϕ, b, ψ) ∈ U1 by (ϕ ∧ (p ∨
χ), b, ψ).
In any of the three cases, M ∗ U ′1 matches the ﬁgure and, furthermore, ex-
actly one of s2 and s3 has a b-successor in M ∗ U ′1. In particular, s2 and s3
are distinguishable in M ∗ U ′1. It follows that s2 and s3 are propositionally
distinguishable.
Summarizing once again, using this new observation: for any arrow update
U1, if M∗U1 matches the drawing and s2 is distinguishable (in M) from some
b-successor (in M∗U1) s3 of s0, then s2 is propositionally distinguishable from
such a b-successor.
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Next, we look at returnx. We have
M, s0 |= b〈l〉(a⊥ ∧ ♦b⊤ ∧ ♦x(♦a⊤ ∧ ♦b(♦b⊤ ∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤))).
Again, this starts with a b operator, so we go to any b-successor of s0 and
assume without loss of generality that this successor is s1. Then there is some
update U1 such that M∗U1, s1 |= (a⊥∧♦b⊤∧♦x(♦a⊤∧♦b(♦b⊤∧b♦a⊤)∧
[l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤))).
We will discuss the [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤) part of this formula later. For
now, note that the other parts of the formula state that the model M∗ U1 can
be drawn as follows.
s0
s1 : a⊥ s2 : ♦a⊤s3 : ♦a⊤
b
b
x
b
Now recall the diagram drawn further above, when discussing propdx. The
only diﬀerence between the two diagrams is that the newer one has an extra
b-arrow from s1 to s0. By the conventions with which we draw these diagrams,
this means the newer diagram is an instance of the older one. So by the fact
that M, s0 |= propdx, we know that if s2 and s3 are distinguishable in M,
then they are propositionally distinguishable so, in particular, that they are
distinguishable in M∗ U1.
Now, we return to the subformula [l](♦a⊤ → bb♦a⊤), which has to hold
in s2. It implies that we cannot retain the a-arrow on s2 while removing the one
on s3. So s2 and s3 are indistinguishable in M ∗ U1. We already determined
that this implies that s2 and s3 are indistinguishable in M as well.
In particular, this implies that there is some state s3 that is b-reachable
from s0 and that is indistinguishable from s2 (in M). So b is what could be
called indistinguishable-transitive over x, i.e. for every (s0, s1) ∈ R(b) and every
(s1, s2) ∈ R(x) there is some s3 that is modally indistinguishable from s2 such
that (s0, s2) ∈ R(b). By the convention to draw indistinguishable worlds as
being the same world, this means our diagram ofM simpliﬁes to the following:
s0
s1 s2
b
b
x
Furthermore, this holds for any b-successor s1 of s0. So there is also a unique
(up to indistinguishability) x-successor s3 of s2 that is b-reachable from s1, a
unique x-successor s4 of s3 that is b-reachable from s0 and so on.
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s0
s1 s2 s3 s4
· · ·
b
b b
b
x x x
Also note that this holds for every direction x ∈ D. So we are approaching the
grid-like structure that we need, with s0 being a special point that lies outside
the grid.
The next two formulas enforce the grid-like structure, by placing restrictions
on certain combinations of directions. Firstly, consider inverse. We have
M, s0 |= b[l](a⊥ → (updowna⊥ ∧downupa⊥
∧leftrighta⊥ ∧rightlefta⊥))
Simply put, this formula states that, for every b-successor s1 of s0, the unique
down-successor of the up-successor of s1 is indistinguishable from s1, and sim-
ilar for the other combinations of opposite directions. So in M the opposite
directions act as each other’s inverses.
Now, consider commute. We have
M, s0 |= b[l]
∧
(x,y)∈E
(♦x♦ya⊥ → yxa⊥)
andE = {(up, left), (up, right), (down , left), (down , right), (left , up), (left , down),
(right , up), (right , down)}. This formula simply states that the up-successor of
the left -successor of s1 is indistinguishable from the left -successor of its up-
successor, and the same for the other combinations of directions.
Putting all of the above together, we learn that the b-successors of s0 form
a two-dimensional grid.3 The remaining conjuncts of ψtypes straightforwardly
encode that this grid is tiled by the set types .
The formula one tile states that every point in the grid satisﬁes exactly one
propositional variable pi with i ∈ types . The formula one color states that
every edge of every point in the grid has at most one color for each direction.
The formula tile colors guarantees that if a point satisﬁes pi then the edge
colors of that point are the edge colors of tile i. Finally, the formula tile match
guarantees that the colors of opposing edges of neighboring states match.
All in all, this shows that if ψtypes is satisﬁable, then the set types can tile
the plane.
Theorem 1. The satisfiability problem of AAUL is co-RE hard.
Proof. Given an instance types of the tiling problem, the formula ψtypes is com-
putable. Furthermore, Lemmas 1 and 2 show that ψtypes is satisﬁable if and only
if types can tile the plane. The tiling problem is known to be co-RE complete
[5], therefore the satisﬁability problem of AAUL is co-RE hard.
3Or, to be slightly more precise: at least one two-dimensional grid. There may be multiple
disconnected grids.
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4 Conclusion
We have shown that the satisﬁability of AAUL is uncomputable, like that of
similar logics such as APAL [8] and GAL [2]. It is not currently known whether
the satisﬁability problem of AAUL is co-RE. Typically, one would show that
a satisﬁability problem is co-RE by providing an axiomatization for the logic,
thereby showing the validities of the logic to be RE. However, while there are
known axiomatizations for AAUL, APAL and GAL, these axiomatizations are
inﬁnitary and therefore cannot be used to enumerate the valid formulas of the
logics in question.4
One interesting direction for future research is therefore to determine whether
the satisﬁability problems of AAUL, APAL and GAL are co-RE complete, and
whether these logics admit ﬁnitary axiomatizations.
In principle, the proof that we gave for the undecidability of AAUL applies
only to the satisﬁability problem when considered over the class of all Kripke
models. However, we believe that the proof can be adapted to work for the
satisﬁability problem with respect to other common classes of models such as
KD45 and S5.
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